波蘭前副總理稱對“一帶一路”在波蘭的進(jìn)展感到失望，問題出在哪里

作為中東歐地區(qū)的最大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，波蘭早在2015年就同中國簽署了共同推進(jìn)“一帶一路”建設(shè)政府間諒解備忘錄。隨著中歐貿(mào)易規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大，波蘭作為歐盟的“東部門戶”、中歐班列沿線重要國家的作用愈發(fā)凸顯。

然而，由于新冠疫情和俄烏沖突，中波關(guān)系受到一定干擾。到2023年，兩國之間逐步恢復(fù)人文往來。6月下旬，共有6個(gè)中方代表團(tuán)同期訪問波蘭；同時(shí)，波方政要也積極參與中國舉行的國際論壇與會(huì)議。

7月5日，波蘭前副總理兼財(cái)政部長、科茲明斯基大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授格熱戈日·科沃德科（Grzegorz Ko?odko）赴華參與“中國與世界：攜手構(gòu)建人類命運(yùn)共同體”國際研討會(huì)。在他訪華期間，北京國際對話俱樂部發(fā)起人、觀察者網(wǎng)特約主持人韓樺在北京專訪科沃德科。

他表示，自己是個(gè)“樂觀主義者”，對中波關(guān)系在“一帶一路”框架下的發(fā)展前景持樂觀態(tài)度；他指出了當(dāng)前存在問題的解決方式，并就波蘭與歐盟關(guān)系、中國模式的國際意義等議題分享了自己的看法。

以下為部分采訪實(shí)錄，因篇幅而有所刪減。

科沃德科5日在“中國與世界：攜手構(gòu)建人類命運(yùn)共同體”國際研討會(huì)致辭（圖源：央視網(wǎng)）

【采訪/韓樺，編輯、翻譯/觀察者網(wǎng) 李澤西】

觀察者網(wǎng)：科沃德科教授，感謝您接受我們的獨(dú)家專訪。首先，今年是“一帶一路”倡議的第10周年，您如何評價(jià)它取得的成果？

科沃德科：我認(rèn)為，在過去的10年間，“一帶一路”為加快發(fā)展中國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速做出了巨大貢獻(xiàn)，特別是在一些非洲、南亞和中東國家，一定程度上也為我所在的地區(qū)（歐洲）做出了貢獻(xiàn)。

當(dāng)然，一切并非一帆風(fēng)順。我們確實(shí)遭遇了新冠疫情的沖擊，這使得各方面合作變得更加困難，尤其是旅行往來。此外，烏克蘭不幸的沖突也已持續(xù)了將近一年半。

歐盟委員會(huì)和中國政府之間有一些合作協(xié)調(diào)，但規(guī)模還不夠。這幾年來，我一直在強(qiáng)調(diào)，我們必須加強(qiáng)歐盟出資的基建項(xiàng)目與中方貸款出資的“一帶一路”投資之間的協(xié)同合作。

盡管如此，總的來說，“一帶一路”的成果是積極的。我們有了更好的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，包括橋、港口、公路和鐵路。作為一名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，我還特別關(guān)注其中創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。

對全球來說，我認(rèn)為“一帶一路”在幫助發(fā)展中的貧窮國家實(shí)現(xiàn)更強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。

觀察者網(wǎng)：大約兩周前，您在華沙參加“‘一帶一路’為中波關(guān)系注入新動(dòng)力”智庫媒體對話會(huì)期間，提到您對“一帶一路”倡議在波蘭的進(jìn)展感到失望。你直言不諱地說，這主要是因?yàn)椴ǚ交驓W洲方面的原因。在您看來，這些問題具體是什么？

科沃德科（左）與中國公共外交協(xié)會(huì)會(huì)長吳海龍（右）出席“‘一帶一路’為中波關(guān)系注入新動(dòng)力”智庫媒體對話會(huì)

科沃德科：我認(rèn)為波蘭政府對擴(kuò)大與中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作持積極態(tài)度，但其中也存在一些不利因素。

一個(gè)大問題是俄烏沖突，俄烏兩國位于中國和波蘭之間，戰(zhàn)爭給中波貨物運(yùn)輸造成了一些物流問題；而波蘭是整個(gè)歐盟的門戶，因此對中歐整體貿(mào)易也有所影響。

我認(rèn)為，還有些問題可能是間接的：目前我們談?wù)摰氖墙?jīng)濟(jì)情況，但雙邊關(guān)系當(dāng)然也包含政治因素。波蘭是北約的重要成員，而北約以美國為首，英國也在其中有較大影響力。美英兩國在地緣政治博弈中扮演了非常重要的角色，他們最近不太愿意深化與中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)合作。

在英美最近的做法中，可以看到很多排外、乃至反華主義的影子，我認(rèn)為這主要是出于政治原因，但也有經(jīng)濟(jì)原因。他們都是非常發(fā)達(dá)的國家，卻似乎懼怕中國的崛起，尤其是在關(guān)鍵技術(shù)方面的進(jìn)展。

澳大利亞戰(zhàn)略政策研究所（ASPI）3月發(fā)布了一份報(bào)告，關(guān)于當(dāng)今44項(xiàng)最重要的技術(shù)，中國在其中37項(xiàng)技術(shù)上位列第一，美國落后；而美國只有7項(xiàng)技術(shù)位列第一，但中國在這些項(xiàng)目上也緊隨其后。

ASPI于3月發(fā)布的《關(guān)鍵技術(shù)追蹤》報(bào)告顯示，中國占據(jù)較大優(yōu)勢

波蘭這場博弈中則扮演了“次要角色”。但總體上，我認(rèn)為波蘭政府、尤其是波蘭的企業(yè)和人民都非常支持深化與中國的合作。

問題是，我們是否在現(xiàn)有條件下竭盡所能深化合作？因?yàn)楹芏鄺l件并不是我們所能決定的，我們雙方都是全球化的一部分。

但是，正如我在自己寫過的論文中指出，并在5日“中國與世界：攜手構(gòu)建人類命運(yùn)共同體”國際研討會(huì)的主旨演講中提到，全球化是一個(gè)不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的過程。在過去幾十年，中國是全球化國際上的最大贏家，而波蘭則是中東歐地區(qū)的最大贏家。

因此，中國現(xiàn)在的問題是如何利用全球化來促進(jìn)自身經(jīng)濟(jì)利益最大化。而波蘭的問題是如何利用不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的全球化促進(jìn)我們的國民經(jīng)濟(jì)，其中不可或缺的是與中國的關(guān)系。

我比較樂觀，但我也意識到，如果政治上少一些感情用事，多一些經(jīng)濟(jì)上的理性考慮，我們將取得更大的成功。我看到兩國關(guān)系的美好前景。

觀察者網(wǎng)：中國提到經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化時(shí)，實(shí)際上與您的一些看法產(chǎn)生了共鳴。在“‘一帶一路’為中波關(guān)系注入新動(dòng)力”智庫媒體對話會(huì)之前，中國國務(wù)院總理李強(qiáng)還在訪問德國。您在研討會(huì)上提到，在波蘭的中企數(shù)量遠(yuǎn)不及在德國的中企數(shù)量，波蘭有80多家中企，而德國有2000多家中企。中國和波蘭的商界人士具體可以怎樣實(shí)現(xiàn)雙贏？

6月19日，李強(qiáng)在柏林同德國工商界代表座談交流（圖源：新華社）

科沃德科：中國如此重視全球化的不可逆轉(zhuǎn)性，推動(dòng)其變得更加包容，用中國的說法，就是“互利共贏”的全球化，我認(rèn)為這是一件好事。當(dāng)然，有時(shí)我開玩笑說，應(yīng)該是互利共贏，而不是中國“贏者通吃”。就目前而言，全球化還不夠包容，有些國家被“落下”了。

我認(rèn)為中方提出全球發(fā)展倡議、全球文明倡議作為“一帶一路”的“下一步”是很好的，我們應(yīng)加大這個(gè)方向的努力，因?yàn)槿蚧绻粔虬荩赡鼙状笥诶?。接下來，我?huì)關(guān)注這些倡議如何落到實(shí)處，在“一帶一路”倡議的第二個(gè)十年，如何治理互利共贏的全球化。

波蘭和德國相比，為什么會(huì)出現(xiàn)中企數(shù)量不平衡？第一，這是企業(yè)總數(shù)，但企業(yè)有大有小，光看企業(yè)數(shù)量不能說明一切。第二，德國經(jīng)濟(jì)是波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)的四倍。此外，在某些技術(shù)方面，德國企業(yè)更加先進(jìn)，他們更容易打入中國市場，因?yàn)橹袊矚g與技術(shù)更先進(jìn)的公司打交道。因此，中企參與波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)的程度肯定不及德國，這是很自然的。

問題是，中波關(guān)系本身的趨勢如何，是否在朝著良好的方向發(fā)展？波蘭對華出口增速高于自己的整體出口增速，雖然中國對波蘭的直接投資規(guī)模仍不及預(yù)期，但其增長速度也高于平均。

此外，新冠疫情阻撓了雙邊關(guān)系發(fā)展，但疫情已幾乎過去了，因此中波雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)的趨勢是先抑后揚(yáng)。

我是從創(chuàng)造就業(yè)的角度看待雙邊或國際合作，有時(shí)就業(yè)才是最關(guān)鍵的。比如中國等國力推的高科技技術(shù)、人工智能技術(shù)或數(shù)字化技術(shù)，可以提高波蘭等國的競爭力和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率，但也會(huì)在短期內(nèi)減少就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，從長遠(yuǎn)來看，這又有利于持續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。

觀察者網(wǎng)：中國國際經(jīng)濟(jì)交流中心曾指出，中國在波蘭曾有個(gè)別投資失敗案例，如A2高速公路項(xiàng)目等，引起了一些不好的反響，影響到了波蘭對中國企業(yè)、中國項(xiàng)目乃至“一帶一路”的直觀感受。您怎么看？我們?nèi)绾尾拍芴岣吖妼Α耙粠б宦贰钡恼w認(rèn)知？

波蘭A2高速公路建設(shè)工地（圖源：AGENCJA GAZETA）

科沃德科：金無足赤，人無完人，失敗時(shí)有發(fā)生，只有不做事的人才不會(huì)犯錯(cuò)。我們要做的是從失敗的真正原因中吸取正確的教訓(xùn)。就輿論而言，我們必須更加關(guān)注正面的例子。

為什么會(huì)存在當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)象？公眾的態(tài)度、公眾的看法在很大程度上取決于媒體敘事，但媒體界往往是“好事不出門，壞事傳千里”。因此，A2項(xiàng)目出現(xiàn)在新聞上的原因是因?yàn)樗×?，是“傳千里”的“壞事”?/p>

我們聽到很多關(guān)于“一帶一路”個(gè)別項(xiàng)目失敗的例子，但基本上聽不到例如中國全面脫貧的新聞，因?yàn)檫@是“不出門”的好事。

還有個(gè)確實(shí)存在且不無道理的問題是，有些人原本對“一帶一路”預(yù)期更高。這個(gè)問題的解決辦法可能需要通過實(shí)踐學(xué)習(xí)。對我們東歐人來說，與中國做生意并不像與西方做生意那樣容易，因?yàn)樯鐣?huì)制度不同。例如，我所在的科茲明斯基大學(xué)，我們教授一門特殊的“中國商務(wù)”課程：如何開展“中國特色”商貿(mào)。中波合作存在的不只是口頭語言的差異，還有商業(yè)或法律語言不通的問題。

這不是失敗的借口，但解釋了為什么有時(shí)不能取得完美成功。我再強(qiáng)調(diào)一次，只有“不做才不錯(cuò)”。

觀察者網(wǎng)：您在波蘭加入經(jīng)合組織（OECD）和歐盟的過程中發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用，代表波蘭簽署了加入經(jīng)合組織的公約。您如何看待波蘭此后與歐盟的關(guān)系？為什么波蘭還沒有用歐元？

科沃德科：確實(shí)，在我的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，波蘭在27年前，即1996年7月11日加入了經(jīng)合組織，我親自代表波蘭在經(jīng)合組織巴黎總部簽署了相關(guān)條約。

科沃德科（右）1996年簽署波蘭加入了經(jīng)合組織的條約

在我最后一次擔(dān)任波蘭副總理兼財(cái)政部長期間，波蘭加入了歐盟（2003年）。如果沒有1996年加入經(jīng)合組織的基礎(chǔ)，我認(rèn)為波蘭在2003年就無法加入歐盟。

但由于種種原因，我們無法加入歐元區(qū)，即便不久后也沒有加入。在我離開波蘭政府后的幾年內(nèi)，波蘭也依然無法滿足加入歐元區(qū)的馬斯特里赫特標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。你不能敲了門就直接“推門而入”，必須滿足馬斯特里赫特的五項(xiàng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)非常苛刻，涉及財(cái)政、貨幣和法律監(jiān)管。

后來，波蘭的政治天平從自由派轉(zhuǎn)向過去8年間的右翼政府，后者非常反對加入歐元區(qū)，聲稱這會(huì)削弱波蘭的競爭力，認(rèn)為波蘭會(huì)放棄一個(gè)非常重要的貨幣政策工具。

這是事實(shí)。用了歐元，就沒有了自己的貨幣，無法操縱匯率或利率，因?yàn)檫@將由法蘭克福的歐洲央行決定。但波蘭使用歐元也有會(huì)一些收獲，我認(rèn)為總體上利大于弊，因此支持波蘭加入歐元區(qū)。

然而現(xiàn)在大多數(shù)波蘭人認(rèn)為加入歐元區(qū)將不利于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。這源于當(dāng)下政府執(zhí)政期間的主流媒體渲染，他們稱歐元是德國主導(dǎo)歐盟的工具——這是在夸大其詞，還稱歐元將使波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)變得不那么靈活，在危機(jī)下將更難調(diào)整政策，而危機(jī)確實(shí)時(shí)有發(fā)生，因此最好保留本國貨幣。

波蘭20年前關(guān)于加入歐盟的全民公決寫道：您是否贊成按照雅典條約的條款加入歐盟？我當(dāng)時(shí)在雅典參與簽署了條約，條約規(guī)定一旦滿足馬斯特里赫特標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，波蘭有權(quán)利也有義務(wù)加入歐元。

2003年雅典，波蘭代表團(tuán)正式加入歐盟后的新聞發(fā)布會(huì)，左一為科沃德科（圖源：波蘭總統(tǒng)辦公室）

77%的人在全民公決中投了贊成票，實(shí)際上也表示支持歐元。但現(xiàn)在，70%的人反對加入歐元，因?yàn)檩浾摳訌?qiáng)調(diào)歐元的負(fù)面影響。既然社會(huì)上大多數(shù)人都反對歐元，我們確實(shí)暫時(shí)不宜使用歐元。

首先，我們必須讓人們相信，從長遠(yuǎn)來看，歐元對他們有利。我們需要的不僅僅是論據(jù)，還要有合適的渠道，將這些論點(diǎn)傳遞給人民的眼睛、耳朵和頭腦，這就是媒體的作用。

如果政府大多數(shù)人反對，使用歐元就不會(huì)發(fā)生。我認(rèn)為他們立場錯(cuò)誤，但決定權(quán)在他們而不是我。我能做的是試圖誘導(dǎo)輿論，用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的邏輯來論證，如果波蘭茲羅提與歐元之間匯率合適，加入歐元是有益的。

合適的匯率，應(yīng)能保證波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)的競爭力。波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展在很大程度上取決于出口帶動(dòng)的增長，因此出口增速必須快于總產(chǎn)出的增長。我們應(yīng)該加入歐元區(qū)，但不能使用匯率過高的貨幣。

因?yàn)槲覀兡壳暗呢泿艆R率過高，此刻加入將削弱我們企業(yè)的競爭力，這是斯洛伐克和立陶宛等國此前犯下的錯(cuò)誤。對波蘭企業(yè)來說，我們的出口或?qū)⑥D(zhuǎn)盈為虧，而進(jìn)口將非常便宜。這對波蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)是不利的。

如果我們加入時(shí)匯率過低，這對我們出口導(dǎo)向的企業(yè)來說是件好事，但進(jìn)口將更昂貴，將加劇通脹。企業(yè)缺乏競爭力是不好的，但大量的通脹也是不好的。

波蘭茲羅提/資料圖

如何管理這些復(fù)雜性、矛盾、相互作用，需要深刻了解經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)邏輯。此外，還需要大量的政治權(quán)力，以確保政治邏輯遵從經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯。經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯基于理性，政治邏輯則往往不同，大多數(shù)時(shí)候基于情緒?，F(xiàn)在，波蘭的情緒反對加入歐元。讓我們等待經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯再次“無可反駁”的時(shí)機(jī)吧。

觀察者網(wǎng)：您深刻闡述了問題，不僅從政治角度，還從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的角度，以及從中波貿(mào)易的角度來看，都是非常有深度的。

科沃德科：我是一直是一名大學(xué)教授，29年前首次加入波蘭政府時(shí)，我認(rèn)為只要掌握事實(shí)和正確知識就足夠了，但我很快就明白了：在政治，在民主制度下，這還不夠，你需要掌握多數(shù)席位。

有時(shí)，無論我說什么，即使是簡單的2×2等于4，也會(huì)有人說不對，應(yīng)該是3，你說的完全錯(cuò)誤，答案是5。

這種情況下，我能做的就是不斷嘗試，必須說服其他政客、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和利益集團(tuán)。有時(shí)他們知道，從國家的角度來看這項(xiàng)政策是好的，但對我的企業(yè)或我所在的地區(qū)不利?，F(xiàn)在的問題是，應(yīng)優(yōu)先考慮哪方利益？如何協(xié)調(diào)地方與國家利益？

此外，我們還是歐盟成員國，這是好事，但也意味著我們還必須在歐盟的框架內(nèi)協(xié)調(diào)自己的政策。許多情況不由我們決定，各國之間有時(shí)會(huì)存在種種經(jīng)濟(jì)利益沖突。

無論是什么經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治體制——哪怕差距有如中國體制與波蘭體制——都存在存在妥協(xié)概念，不能強(qiáng)推自己的想法，即使你是正確的，因?yàn)槠渌擞袡?quán)不理解、害怕、要求你再解釋。

觀察者網(wǎng)：中國體制在某種程度上也有類似的復(fù)雜性，也需要考慮您描述的如何協(xié)調(diào)地方、省級與國家級的權(quán)責(zé)利益等。因此，這也許也是中國的模式，中國的現(xiàn)代化道路可以分享予全世界的一點(diǎn)。

科沃德科：毋庸置疑，各國可以借鑒中國的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在過去的40年間，中國取得了無與倫比的成功，這是文明的一個(gè)飛躍。問題是，其他國家能從中學(xué)到什么？我們覺得，東歐、歐盟或美國很難借鑒很多經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

科沃德科接受觀察者網(wǎng)采訪

其他發(fā)展中國家確實(shí)可以學(xué)到很多東西，但也是有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的，因?yàn)橹袊某晒κ莾煞N力量的獨(dú)特結(jié)合：市場這只“看不見的手”的力量與政府這只“看得見的手”的力量。

其他國家可能說，我們也要這樣做，我們要把政府的官僚、政黨和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的力量與市場的力量結(jié)合起來。但是，這取決于執(zhí)行的質(zhì)量，需有非常強(qiáng)大的政府。

比如，沙特阿拉伯政府不比中國政府弱，或許沙特在其國內(nèi)權(quán)力更大，但卻相對不太成功。為什么？各國不僅需要以適當(dāng)?shù)姆绞浇Y(jié)合市場和政府的力量，還必須結(jié)合任人唯賢與技術(shù)官僚制度，這樣才有可能成功。

這其中還需要的，是文化。當(dāng)然，我不覺得中國人一定比其他國家的人更熱愛工作，在歐洲也經(jīng)常有人稱波蘭人比其他人更有創(chuàng)業(yè)精神，也許我們是有一點(diǎn)，但這種解釋太簡略了。商業(yè)文化，才對整個(gè)體系的運(yùn)作有影響。

我把中國模式稱為“中國主義”，以強(qiáng)調(diào)其特異性。如果一個(gè)小國表示要走中國道路，我會(huì)建議他們在符合當(dāng)?shù)匚幕那闆r下，盡可能多借鑒中國模式，但也要考慮當(dāng)?shù)貒椤ν瑯拥膯栴}，在穆斯林國家與新教、天主教或世俗國家的回答是不同的。經(jīng)濟(jì)上，對于通脹源自進(jìn)口和通脹源自國內(nèi)的國家，抗擊通脹的方式也是不同的。

我提倡的新實(shí)用主義——你們可稱之為具有“中國特色”的新實(shí)用主義——極力反對新自由主義推行單一模式的做法。你有你的尺碼，你的服裝必須量身定制，而不是根據(jù)其他人的尺寸，因?yàn)樗麄兛赡苡胁煌某叽?。每個(gè)尺寸都有自己獨(dú)特的美觀，但也有各自的不同。經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治都是非常復(fù)雜的話題。

觀察者網(wǎng)：耶倫女士今天上午剛剛結(jié)束了她對中國的訪問。您如何看待中美雙方處理經(jīng)貿(mào)合作關(guān)系，尤其在兩國關(guān)系緊張的情況下？

科沃德科：我認(rèn)為耶倫訪華，并與中國經(jīng)濟(jì)界的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)見是個(gè)很好的跡象。我希望他們以一種非常務(wù)實(shí)的方式討論雙邊關(guān)系的問題和其全球后果。很多事情都取決于中美關(guān)系，包括在我的國家（波蘭）。

8日，國務(wù)院副總理、中美經(jīng)貿(mào)中方牽頭人何立峰會(huì)見耶倫

其次，我確實(shí)很欣賞她的做派。她在訪問前說了一句話，這句話在美國、英國、歐盟等地的所有人都“不樂意”聽到，尤其是（對華）鷹派人士。她說，因?yàn)樽约菏且粋€(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家——一個(gè)合理、受過良好教育的聰明人——總是談?wù)撆c中國脫鉤是無稽之談。

雙邊相互依存關(guān)系太深、太大，中美不能脫鉤，強(qiáng)行脫鉤等于“自殺”美國自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)，因?yàn)槲覀冊诔掷m(xù)的全球化過程經(jīng)濟(jì)中深度融合，產(chǎn)生太多的相互依賴，以至于現(xiàn)在我們不能撤出這一進(jìn)程了。

她說，現(xiàn)在不應(yīng)進(jìn)行任何脫鉤，但應(yīng)討論幾個(gè)具體問題，例如：知識產(chǎn)權(quán)、信息和專利轉(zhuǎn)移、對一些行業(yè)的保護(hù)、決定哪些是戰(zhàn)略產(chǎn)業(yè)而哪些不是、停止禁運(yùn)——中國剛剛宣布，他們將禁運(yùn)鍺和另一種對高科技技術(shù)至關(guān)重要的稀土金屬的出口，這是中國對美國行動(dòng)的反應(yīng)——征收貿(mào)易關(guān)稅，等等。

因此，她訪華并討論這些問題是很重要的。從今天的角度來看，這次訪問可能還沒有取得足夠的進(jìn)展，但絕對不是失敗。我認(rèn)為耶倫訪華比布林肯訪華更有成效，也許因?yàn)椴剂挚系乃季S方式是徹頭徹尾的“政客頭腦”，但耶倫卻試圖從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家角度思考。

現(xiàn)在的問題是，回到美國，她將如何在白宮工作人員會(huì)議上向美國總統(tǒng)拜登匯報(bào)，并怎樣與美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席鮑威爾溝通，等等。就美中經(jīng)濟(jì)和金融關(guān)系而言，她的影響力有多大？我擔(dān)心她可能“勢單力薄”，尤其是面對那些對經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理解不深的美國鷹派人士，或者即使他們理解經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，也不足夠地重視經(jīng)濟(jì)，在某種程度上容易忽視經(jīng)濟(jì)對全球的意義。他們過于關(guān)注政治，對自己負(fù)責(zé)的經(jīng)濟(jì)不夠關(guān)注。

布林肯和耶倫（圖源：AP）

我一直在努力尋找經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治之間，經(jīng)濟(jì)政策和非經(jīng)濟(jì)政策之間的相互作用。此刻大家對我們生活中的經(jīng)濟(jì)層面都顯然沒有予以足夠的重視，無論是從個(gè)人還是全球?qū)用妗?/p>

中美關(guān)系中政治因素太多了，錯(cuò)誤的政治考量也經(jīng)常被卷入這些爭端中。它使一切變得更加“有趣”，但同時(shí)更具挑戰(zhàn)性。我認(rèn)為自己是個(gè)樂觀主義者，因?yàn)槲抑牢覀兠媾R的每一個(gè)問題都有解決辦法，但這并不意味著它們正在被解決，也不保證它們將來會(huì)被解決。比如，我們知道如何應(yīng)對氣候變化，但我們做得還不夠。

現(xiàn)在是推行基于事實(shí)與知識、對未來負(fù)責(zé)的政治的時(shí)候了。這就是為什么我對政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)感興趣。每當(dāng)我來到中國，或在波蘭遇到中國客人時(shí)，我都很樂意討論這個(gè)問題，即使我們有意見分歧，因?yàn)榉制缈梢蕴岣呶覀兊乃枷搿Ｎ覀儽仨毧紤]未來該怎么做，或許一切都可能變得更好，但這將取決于我們今天做出的選擇，不是注定的。

英文原文（部分）：

Guancha: Professor Ko?odko, thanks for this exclusive interview. The very first question is, as the BRI approaches its 10th anniversary, how would you rate its success?

Ko?odko:I think that it has contributed significantly over the last 10 years to acceleration of economic growth in developing countries, especially some countries in Africa, South Asia and Middle East, to a lesser degree in my part of the world.

There were some problems in the meantime. We did have Covid, which made the cooperation much more difficult, starting from travel. Now we have almost a year and a half this unfortunate conflict in Ukraine.

But there was also a little bit but not enough coordination between European Commission and the Chinese governments.

I've been saying for several years that we have to give more attention to cooperation between infrastructure projects co-financed by the European Union and Belt and Road investment co-financed by lending from China.

But having said so, in general, the evaluation is positive. We have a little bit better points of infrastructure, a bridge here, harbor over there, road or piece of railroad in another country. And I'm an economist, of course, it has created job opportunities.

But going back to the global evaluation, it is positive, I see it as an instrument of getting more robust economic growth in catching up countries, poorer countries.

Guancha: About two weeks ago in Warsaw, while attending the seminar between the Chinese and Polish intellectuals and media representatives, you mentioned your disappointment towards BRI’s progress in Poland in particular. And you said bluntly that it is mostly because of the Polish government or probably the European side. So what are these issues in particular in your opinion and how to tackle these issues or challenges, in your opinion?

Ko?odko:Well, the Polish government is rather sympathetic towards expansion, continuation of the economic cooperation with China. Yet there are some problems.

One big problem is this conflict in Ukraine. If you are taking a look on the map, Russia and Ukraine is just between China and Poland. And that is causing some logistical problems with transport of goods from China to Poland and remaining part of the European Union, one must see Poland as the gates to European Union.

I think that also maybe some problems are indirect: we are talking economics, but there is also politics. And Poland is a very important member of NATO, which by all means is led by the United States with the very big strong and influential position of United Kingdom. And these two very important countries in the geopolitical game, US and UK, are somehow reluctant recently to widen and deepen economic cooperation with China.

You may see a lot of, I may say xenophobia, if not anti-China-ism, in the American and British approach, mostly I think for non-economic political reasons, but also for economic ones. These countries, which are very much advanced, they seem to be somehow afraid, scared of China's rise, especially in critical technologies.

There is the recently published report by Australian Strategic Policy Institute about 44 most important technologies in the contemporary world. And out of this 44, in as many as 37 cases, China is number one, US is number second or alternatively, only in seven cases, US is number one and China is number two.

So now we are somehow a minor player in this game.

I think that Poland, our government, but first of all our business and our people, we are very much in favor of deepening and extending our cooperation with China.

The question is, are we doing everything that is possible under the given circumstances? Because not everything depends on us, I mean as you in Beijing, in China, and us in Warsaw, in Poland, we are part of globalization.

But as I'm pointing in my papers and I pointing to this aspect also during my keynote speech at the conference hosted here in China recently by China Academy of Social Sciences, that globalization is an irreversible process.

I don't see any other country which has gained so much from globalization over the last generation as China. And I think that I can’t see any other country in East Central Europe, which gained from globalization as much as we have done in Poland.

So now the question is on the Chinese side, how to take advantage of ongoing globalization on behalf of China's people, China's economy. And our question is how to take advantage of irreversible globalization, of which an indispensable part is our relation with China on behalf of our national economy.

So I'm rather positive, but still I'm aware that much more would be accomplished if there will be less of sometimes emotionally driven politics and much more of rationality driven economic concern. I see a good future for these relations.

Guancha: Chinese President Xi Jinping actually resonated some of your observations by mentioning or proposing the economic globalization. Before our seminar in Warsaw two weeks ago, Chinese premier Li Qiang was actually visiting Germany. You observed in the seminar by mentioning that the number of Chinese companies in Poland is actually dwarfed by the number of Chinese companies in Germany, about 80+ companies versus more than 2000 companies. What specifically can Chinese and Polish business people do to make it a two-way street?

Ko?odko:It's good that China's president is giving so much attention to irreversibility of globalization, presuming that it will be more inclusive. You call it in China, win-win globalization. Sometimes I'm joking that, let's have it win-win, not 2:0 for China. Definitely, for the time being, globalization has not been inclusive enough. There are some countries which are being left behind, which are being excluded, not included in the bold global process.

And now, when China's leader is coming with Global Development Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative as a certain follow up to global Belt and Road Initiative, good, let's try to go further towards this direction, because globalization, if it is not inclusive enough, can cause more problems than solve problems. Now, after the words, I'm looking for the deeds, how this win-win globalization will be managed and governed during the second decade of Belt and Road initiative.

Comparing Poland and Germany, why there is such an imbalance? This is the number of the companies, but there are some huge companies and there are some small companies.

Second point is, German economy is 4 times bigger than the Polish economy.

In certain technologies, German companies are more advanced. For that reason, they have easier access to Chinese market, because China is interested more in dealing with more technologically advanced companies.

So, it's natural that our engagement is relatively not as big as in the case of Germany. The question is, what is the dynamic? Exports to China is growing faster than average Polish exports overseas. Direct investment is still not as big as I hope they will be in the future, but they are growing above the average.

Recently, again, there was the turbulence because of Covid, but Covid is almost gone. So I think that the curve will look like this, and now it will look like that (first down then up). I’m taking a look for bilateral cooperation, international or global cooperation from the viewpoint of job creation.

Sometimes that is the question mark, because if China trade high tech technologies, artificial intelligence technology or digitalization, when it is brought to Poland or to other countries, this can push our competitiveness and our labor productivity, but is decreasing the jobs. But in the longer run, it works on behalf of sustaining economic growth.

Guancha: ?The China Center for International Economic Exchange had pointed out that the failure of a few high profile projects, such as the A2 Highway in Poland. This kind of projects contributed to some negative perception of the BRI in Poland. What's your take on that? How can we better inform the public of the overall positive story of the BRI.

Ko?odko:Nothing is perfect, failure from time to time happens. As the proverb goes, only the one who is doing nothing is not committing mistakes.

What we have to do is we have to draw the proper lessons from the true causes of this failure. We have to focus attention, as far as the public debate is concerned, on positive examples.

There is always the question. Why? Public attitude, public perception is very much the result of public media narrative, as the other saying goes. Good news is not the news. Only bad news is in news. And for that reason, that was the news because it was a failure.

So you may hear much more about this one example of failure within the Belt and Road Initiative project, but you cannot hear that much, for instance, that recently China has erased entirely extreme poverty, because this is the good news.

There is also certain disappointment and not without justification: much more was expected.

Sometimes, the problem is process of learning by doing. It is not that easy for us in East Europe to do business with China, as it is with the West, because of difference of the social systems.

For instance, at my Kozminski University, we teach a special course program “China's business”: how to make business with Chinese characteristics. It is not only the question of language, this is the problem of lack of compatibility of business language, or law language.

And that is not an excuse. That is an explanation why sometimes there is not a firework success as it was expected. Once more, the only one who is never failing is the one who is doing nothing.

Guancha: You had played a key role in Poland’s accession to OECD and the EU, actually having signed the convention joining OECD. What do you think of Poland’s relationship with the EU since then? Why has Poland not adopted the Euro as your currency yet?

Ko?odko:Indeed. Under my stewardship, Poland joined OECD exactly 27 years ago, on 11th of July, 1996, with this hand, I signed the accession treaty in OECD headquarters in Paris.

And when I was for the fourth and last time the deputy prime minister and minister of finance of the Polish government, we brought Poland to the European Union. I would say it would not have happened around 20 years ago, if not for joining OECD in 1996.

But for several reasons, at the same time, we could not, and soon after we did not join Eurozone, because the government after I left was not able to make the Maastricht criteria of currency conversions. You cannot just sign, knock knock, I want to join you. You have to meet five criteria from Maastricht, which are very tough, vis-a-vis fiscal, monetary and law regulation.

And then the political pendulum has shifted from liberal government to right wing government, which we have had for 8 years. And this government is very much against joining Euro, because this government says that it will weaken Polish competitiveness, it will deprive us of a very important instrument, which is monetary policy.

That is true. If you have Euro, you don't have your own currency, so you cannot manipulate exchange rate or interest rate, it is decided by the Central European bank based in Frankfurt. But we'll get something in exchange of that. My position is still positive. I'm in favor of joining Euro.

But now, people in Poland are convinced that would be not good for economy, because they've been told for many years during this government by mainstream media that Euro is an instrument of German dominance of the European Union, which is a great exaggeration, that Euro will make our economy less flexible, and it will be more difficult to adjust in the case of crisis, and crisis happened from time to time, better keep national currency.

During the referendum 20 years ago about accession to the European Union, there was also the point: Are you in favor of joining the European Union on the terms in Athens treaty? I was in Athens when we signed the treaty saying that Poland has a right and obligation to join the Euro pending that we meet the criteria from Maastricht.

77% of people in the referendum voted in favor. So actually they said that we are in favor of Euro. But now 70% is against joining the Euro because of public discussion on how bad Euro would be for economy. I'm saying that when majority of the society is against that kind of reform, don't do it.

First, we have to convince the people it will be on their behalf in the long run. But to do so, you need not only arguments. You have to have the channel to deliver these arguments to the people, eyes, ears, and minds. And that is going through the media.

It will never happen if the government majority are against, and I think they are wrong, but they decide, not me.

I may attempt to make an influence impact on the public opinion. I'm arguing using economic logic, why it will be good under one condition: if we will convert currency at the proper exchange rate.

What is proper exchange rate? The one which will guarantee competitiveness of Poland’s economy. Because Poland’s economic future very much depends on export led growth, exports must be growing faster than overall output. We should join Euro, but not with too strong currency.

Because our currency is too strong at the moment, that was the mistake committed, for instance, by Slovakia and Lithuania, then it will erode competitiveness of our entrepreneurship. Our exports will cease to be profitable for Polish business and import will be very cheap. That is not going to work for the Polish economy.

If we would join with too weak currency, that would be good for our export oriented sector, but import would be relatively more expensive, and that would fuel inflation. A lack of competitiveness is bad, but a lot of inflation is also bad.

How to manage all this complexity, all these contradictions, all these feedbacks, you have to know a lot about how the economy works. You need also a lot of political power to enforce the economic logic on political logic. Economic logic is based on rationality. Political logic has different rationale, and most of the time is based on emotions. Now, emotions are against joining Euro. And let's wait for a time when again, the power of economic logic will be preferred.

Guancha: I think this is a very strong argument, not only from the political perspective, but from an economist’s perspective, as well as from the Sino-Polish trade perspective, which is very strong.

Ko?odko:I'm a long time university professor, when I joined for the first time the Polish government 29 years ago, I thought that it is enough to be correct, it is enough to be right, it is enough to be knowledgeable. And then I understood pretty fast: in politics, in a democratic system, it's not enough, you need a majority.

Sometimes whatever I said, even if it was almost as simple that 2×2 makes four, somebody says no, three, not at all, five.

What you do is you keep trying, as long as you can, you have to convince the other policy makers, the other economists, and the others interests. Sometimes they know that it is good from national viewpoint, but not for my business, not for my region. Now the question is, what is coming first, what is coming second? How to coordinate regional needs and ambitions and obstacles with the national one?

And now, we are the member of the European Union. Good for us, but now we have to coordinate the policies of our country within the framework of the European Union. Not everything is up to us, and there are sometimes conflict of economic interest.

Whatever the economic and political system, can be as different as the Chinese system and our Polish system, there is compromise, you cannot enforce what you wish, even if you are right against everybody else, because everybody else has the right to not understand, to be afraid, to ask again for explanation.

Guancha: China's economic landscape to some extent has similar complexity, like you describing how to manage the local, the provincial level status versus the national level status and so on, so forth. So maybe there is this China model, China's path to modernization that can be shared worldwide.

Ko?odko:Countries may learn from China’s experience. There is no doubt about that. There is incomparable success in china over the last 40 years. It's a civilization leap forward. The question is, what can other countries learn from this experience? We cannot learn a lot in Eastern Europe or in the European Union or in the United States.

But other developing countries can learn a lot, but it's a risky business, because China's success is caused by unique combination of two powers: the power of the invisible hand of market, and the power of the visible hand of government.

Somebody says we will do the same, we'll combine our power of the government's bureaucracy, party, leadership with power of market. This depends on the quality of implementation. You have very powerful government.

I wouldn't say that Saudi Arabia government is weaker than Chinese government. Maybe it's even more strong, and somehow they are not successful. Why? It's not only the question of power of market and power of government to be combined in the proper way. It is also that it must be accompanied by meritocracy, by technocracy, then it may work.

What is the remaining ingredient of this recipe? It's culture. I wouldn't say that Chinese people love to work harder than other nations.

In my part of the world, we hear often that Polish people are more entrepreneurial than the others. Maybe we are a little bit, but don't make it easier by that kind of explanation that. But there is business culture, which has an influence on the working of the whole system.

I'm referring to this Chinese system as Chinese-ism in English language to stress that it's something very unique, something very specified. If I hear in a small country that we will go the Chinese way, I say, try to get as much from Chinese model as is compatible with your local culture, but also put it in the context. The same question, you answer somehow differently in the Muslim country than you do in the Protestant country or Catholic country or a secular country.

You answer how to fight inflation differently in a country where it is basically imported inflation and when it is basically domestic cost inflation.

So my new pragmatism, you may call it in China “with Chinese characteristics”, is very much against this neoliberal approach of one size fits all. You have your size, and your costume must fit in your size, not the size of each and every other person, because they may have different size. Each size is beautiful, but there are different sizes. So this is much more complex as far as economics and politics are concerned.

Guancha: Madam Janet Yellen just wrapped up her visit to China this morning. How do you see China and America handle this economic cooperation, given the tensions of the two countries?

Ko?odko:I think it was a very good development that Mrs. Yellen decided to come to China and she met Chinese economic political leaders. And I hope she discussed with them in a very pragmatic way, the problems of bilateral relations with global consequences. So much depends, also in my country, upon Sino American relations.

Secondly, I do appreciate her behavior. She said before her visit and it was not liked by everybody in Washington, in London, in Brussels, especially by the Hawks circle. She said, because she is an economist, reasonable, well educated, smart, that it's nonsense to always talk about decoupling with China.

The interdependence is too deep, too large, we cannot decouple, or we may but that would be suicide for our own economy, because there is too much interdependence as the result of ongoing globalization that we cannot withdraw from this process.

She says that there is no time for any decoupling, but there is a time to discuss several issues: intellectual property, trading of information, patent, protection of maybe some industries, deciding what is strategic and what is not strategic, getting rid of embargo, China has just declared that they will actually embargo export of Germanium and another rare earth metal which is critical for high tech technology, which is China's action reaction for American action, imposing trade tariffs, etc.

So it's important that she has come, that they discuss these issues. There is not enough progress which we may see from today's perspective, but definitely it is not a failure. And I think that Ms. Yellen’s visit to Beijing has been much more productive than Mr Blinken’s visit to Beijing, maybe because his way of thinking is strictly political. And she attempted to think as an economist.

Now the question is, back to Washington DC, what she will report at the meeting of the staff of the White House, when she will be briefing President Biden, when she will call Mr Powell, the chairman of American System of Federal Reserves, etc. So the question is, how influential is she as far as US-China economic and financial relations are concerned? I'm afraid that she may be not strong enough, that American Hawks who have poor understanding of economics, or if they have, they do not appreciate it as much as it's supposed to be, they are somehow prone to neglect the meaning of economy for the global situation. They pay too much attention to politics and not enough to economics that they are at the lead.

I'm always trying to find the feedback between economics and politics, between economic policy and non-economic policy. And now there is definitely not enough attention given to the economic aspect of our life, individually and globally.

And there is too much politics, wrong politics being engaged in all these disputes. It makes everything more interesting but still more challenging. But I'm an optimist because I do know that each and every one of the problems that we are talking about are solvable, but it does not imply that they are being solved, and it does not guarantee that they will be solved. We do know how to fight with warming of the climate, but we are not doing enough.

It's time for knowledge based, accountable in the long run politics. This is where my interest in political economy are coming from. And whenever I come into China or I can meet Chinese guest in Poland, I'm happy to discuss this issue, even when we disagree, because disagreement is, if you will, for refreshing the thought. So we have to think how to act and then it may be better, but not necessarily will. It depends on us.

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